Spain in the Seventeenth Century by Graham Darby

Author:Graham Darby [Darby, Graham]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, General, Europe
ISBN: 9781317897712
Google: l4qrAgAAQBAJ
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2014-01-14T01:21:50+00:00

Revival, 1649–56

Out of Westphalia there arose a balance of power between France and the Habsburgs (85, p. 381), despite the fact that a Spanish offensive on the Flanders front had come to grief at Lens in August. Leopold William lost 9,000 men in this defeat at the hands of Condé; however, the victory for France was more spectacular than decisive, as with the outbreak of civil war in France – the Frondes – there was no possibility of a follow-up. Nevertheless, Spain was forced to scale down its operations in Flanders and a stalemate ensued. In both 1649 and 1650 Mazarin offered Philip peace, but the King insisted on a return to the status quo ante bellum (namely, the position in 1635) and would not countenance any concessions. Rather than indulging in Olivares-like obstinacy, it would appear that Philip felt the opportunities for recovery were there for the taking, and he was right. In Italy the French were driven from the presidios* (1650), and two years later Spanish forces captured the fortress of Casale that had been Olivares’s objective in the Mantuan War. In Flanders, Gravelines was taken in May 1652 and in September the Spanish re-took Dunkirk. In 1653 Ypres and Mardyk were recaptured and in 1654, Rocroi, that supposed graveyard of Spanish military might, fell to the Army of Flanders. However, the real prize of these years was the reconquest of Catalonia.

Catalonia had been formally annexed by France and a Bourbon viceroy had been installed in Barcelona. However, the substitution of Louis XIII and later Louis XIV for Philip IV had solved none of Catalonia’s problems; the Catalans had merely traded one master for another, harsher one. This was the background to the Spanish campaign which led to the recapture of Barcelona in October 1652. Spain had learnt its lesson and Catalonia was treated gently. Its rights were confirmed, but the province now willingly paid a contribution to the war effort, and Barcelona alone contributed 150,000 ducats* per annum. Twelve years of French occupation had made the Catalans the most anti-French of Spain’s provinces.

The year 1652 was something of an annus mirabilis for Spain, and the European balance of power seemed to be shifting back in its favour. However, Spanish success had been bought at enormous cost. Philip IV reported to the Cortes* in 1655 that military expenditure between 1649 and 1654 had been 66.8 million ducats* in silver. Indeed, despite the bankruptcy of 1647 the treasury was in trouble again by 1650. Inflation was rampant, and 98 per cent of the coinage was copper, for Spain, the owner of the American silver mines, had no silver. The crown seized 1 million ducats of private bullion imports from the Indies and anticipated revenue to 1655. It also expanded vellón* output, to pay for the campaign in Catalonia, but then in 1652 instituted another savage deflation. Monetary disorder could hardly have been worse. Then the government announced yet another bankruptcy* only five years after the previous one.

Financial failure explains why the Spanish Monarchy was unable to follow up its successes of 1652.

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